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Abstract—This paper considers secure communication over
free-space optical (FSO) links suffering from turbulence-induced
fading. In particular, we study the average secrecy capacity of
applying physical layer security to achieve security in an FSO
communication system with binary-level on-off keying intensity
modulation and threshold detection, a widely used system in
FSO communication. We first define the instantaneous secrecy
capacity for our system and then provide a lower bound of
it, which is achieved based on a simple design principle for
practical applications and yields a simpler equation. We next
derive a general expression of the average secrecy capacity and
the corresponding lower bound based on bit error probabilities.
Finally, numerical analysis is conducted for the special case of
the correlated log-normal fading model to show the impacts of
fading and channel correlation on the average secrecy capacity.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy capacity, free-
space optical communication, on-off keying.
I. INTRODUCTION
Laser-based free-space optical (FSO) communication, a
communication technology that uses high-directional laser
beam to transmit data in free space, has attracted considerable
attention recently due to its merits, like high-data-rate and
cost-effective [1]. Although it has high directionality, FSO
communication still suffers from the security issue because
of the openness of wireless medium, especially when the
main lobe of the laser beam is considerably wider than the
receiver size [2]. Thus, solving the security issue is critical to
support its application in some mission-critical applications,
like satellite communication and military communication.
Recently, there has been a great interest in applying physical
layer security to achieve information security in wireless
communication systems, since it enables tractable performance
analysis and also enables positive secrecy data rate even when
the channel to the target receiver is in worse condition than that
to an eavesdropper [3], [4]. In FSO communication, channel
condition depends strongly on the atmospheric environment
between the transmitter and the receiver, which keeps varying
over time and space randomly [5], [6]. Therefore, physical
layer security schemes which adapt to the change of the chan-
nel condition are really important in FSO communications.
Secrecy capacity, defined as the maximum information rate
at which the source can transmit to the receiver without
the eavesdropper being able to acquire any information, is
a key metric to assess the security level of an FSO system
based on physical layer security. By now, although exten-
sive theoretical and experimental performance analysis has
been conducted for FSO communications, only few studies
on secrecy capacity of FSO systems have been done. [7]
characterized the probability of positive secrecy capacity in
the presence of atmospheric turbulence-induced random fading
for two eavesdropping scenarios. In [2], Wang et al. studied
the capacity of secret key generation for air-to-ground FSO
communication. And the secrecy capacity for indoor visible
light communication without fading phenomenon based on
multiple-input and single-output (MISO) Gaussian model was
analyzed in [8]. More recently, numerical study on the secrecy
capacity has been conducted in [9] for FSO channels based
on the on-off keying (OOK) modulation and photon counting
demodulation without considering the random fading effect.
In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity of laser-based
FSO communication systems where OOK intensity modula-
tion with direct detection (IM/DD) is employed. Notice that,
due to their simplicity and low cost, IM/DD systems are widely
used in FSO communications [1]. Our contributions in this
paper are summarized as follows.
• We define the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the FSO
system with binary-level OOK intensity modulation and
threshold detection under a given pair of fading states.
• We derive a lower bound of the instantaneous secrecy
capacity of the fading FSO system based on bit error
probabilities, and prove that this lower bound is just the
maximum instantaneous secrecy rate when the detection
threshold at the eavesdropper is halfway between the
expected outputs of the binary input symbol ‘0’ and ‘1’.
• With the help of the above result, we derive a general
expression of the average secrecy capacity of the fading
FSO system and also its lower bound.
• By specializing the average secrecy capacity to the cor-
related log-normal fading model, we provide numerical
analysis to explore the impacts of fading, channel cor-
relation and the atmospheric turbulence (fading) strength
on the secrecy capacity, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model and performance metrics for the
FSO system. In Section III, we provide a lower bound of the
instantaneous secrecy capacity and derive a general formula
of the average secrecy capacity for the fading FSO system.
In Section IV, we specialize the above general formula to
the correlated log-normal fading model and conduct numerical
analysis. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
In this section, we introduce the system model and perfor-
mance metrics. The notation and symbols used throughout the
paper are summarized in Table I. Note that C denotes the
capacity of a general channel while Cb is the capacity of the
channel to Bob, and the similar rule will be used in other cases
when there is no fear of confusion. By default, log(·) refers
to the natural logarithm.
A. System model
We consider a laser-based FSO system in which a trans-
mitter (named Alice) tries to transmit confidential messages
to a receiver (named Bob) over a wireless optical link in the
presence of an eavesdropper (named Eve). In the FSO system
we consider that the binary-level on-off keying modulation and
threshold detection are adopted [10], [11].
The channel model of the FSO communication system is
given by the expression
Yu = ηItxe
−δduHuX + Zu, (1)
where u ∈ {b, e} denotes the user Bob or Eve, Yu is the
electric current of the signal received at u, η is photo-diode
responsivity, Itx denotes the radiant emittance of the laser
beam at transmitter, e−δdu represents the intensity attenuation
loss in free space (mainly due to absorption and scattering),
δ being an attenuation loss coefficient and du the distance
from the transmitter to u [12], Hu is a random variable
(RV) that models the normalized optical irradiance fluctuation
of the channel to u (caused by refractive-index variations),
X ∈ {0, 1} is the binary input symbol, and Zu ∼ N (0, σ2u)
models the combined effects of the thermal noise and the
background noise at the receiver [2]. The system model in
(1) can be simplified as
Yu = SuHuX + Zu, (2)
where Su = ηItxe−δdu represents the electric current received
at u for the on-state input (symbol ‘1’) in the absence of at-
mospheric turbulence-induced irradiance fluctuation. The input
probability of X is given by PX(1) = q and PX(0) = 1 − q
with q ∈ [0, 1]. The detection threshold at Bob and Eve are
denoted by τb and τe, respectively.
In this model, the maximum power constraint is imposed for
the transmission of each symbol, that is, the radiant emittance
for symbol ‘1’ is just the maximum value Itx and that for
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
u u ∈ {b, e} denotes the user Bob or Eve
Yu Signal current received at u
X X ∈ {0, 1} denotes the input symbol
Zu Zu ∼ N (0, σ2u) denotes the Gaussian distributed noise at u
with zero-mean and variance σ2u
η Photo-diode responsivity
Itx Radiant emittance of the laser beam at the transmitter Alice
δ Intensity attenuation loss constant in free space
du Distance from the transmitter to u
τu User u’s detection threshold
Hu A random variable (RV) that models the mean-normalized
irradiance fading of the channel to u
Su Su = ηItxe−δdu denotes the signal current received at u
for symbol ‘1’ without turbulence-induced fading
γu γu =
Su
σu
denotes the average electrical SNR at u
yu Mean value of the output signal current under the state hu
Tu Tu ∼ N (µTu , σ
2
Tu
) is a Gaussian distributed RV
and related to Hu as Hu = exp(Tu)
q Transmission probability of input ‘1’, i.e., PX(1) = q
ρ Correlation coefficient between Tb and Te
ρH Correlation coefficient between Hb and He
εb, εe Error probabilities at Bob and Eve, resp.
Cs Secrecy capacity
Cu Capacity of the channel from Alice to u
P(·) Probability operator
E(·) Expectation operator
symbol ‘0’ is zero. We assume σb = σe, in order to focus on
exploring the impact of fading on the secrecy capacity.
The codeword corresponding to a confidential message is
assumed to be transmitted over one coherence interval. It is
also assumed that both Bob’s and Eve’s channels are under
quasi-static fading, that is, Hb and He, albeit random, are
constants during the transmission of an entire codeword (i.e.,
a coherence interval) and, moreover, vary independently from
codeword to codeword. Bob and Eve are assumed to know
their own channel states Hb and He respectively, and Alice is
assumed to know both channel states before the transmission
of the codeword. This assumption is made to analyze the
average secrecy capacity and it corresponds to the situation,
for example, where Eve is another active user in the wireless
TDMA network [13].
B. Performance metrics
In a communication system, secrecy capacity is a key metric
to measure the tightest upper bound on the average amount of
information that can be reliably transmitted over the channel
to the target receiver while keeping the eavesdropper totally
ignorant about the information. In this paper, we will use
the secrecy capacity to measure the performance of applying
the physical layer security scheme in the considered system.
Before defining the secrecy capacity, we will introduce the
definition of capacity in our model in the hope of making the
definition of secrecy capacity easier to understand.
Usually, capacity is a function of the matrix of channel
transition probabilities in a discrete memoryless channel [14],
for instance, a function of the detection threshold τ under a
given realization of fading h in our system, i.e., C(τ ;h) =
maxq I(X ;Y ), where I(·) refers to the mutual information
[14]. This is because for the considered FSO channel under
a gvien fading state, the channel can be viewed as a binary
asymmetric channel with crossover probabilities for ‘0’ and
‘1’ determined by the detection threshold. However, in the
considered system, we can adjust the detection threshold τ and
also the input probability parameter q, thus the instantaneous
capacity is given by C(h) = maxq,τ I(X ;Y ) correspond-
ingly1. Since Alice cannot control and also doesn’t know Eve’s
detection threshold, the secrecy capacity should be achieved
by assuming that Eve adopts its optimal detection threshold
for any q. Since σb = σe is assumed, we are able to construct a
wire-tap channel such that Bob’s channel is more capable than
Eve’s channel when hb > he [15]. Hence, the instantaneous
secrecy capacity of the considered system for fading states hb
and he is defined by
Cs(hb, he) = max
q,τb
{I(X ;Yb)−max
τe
I(X ;Ye)}. (3)
Meanwhile, when Alice and Eve’s detection thresholds are
given, the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate is defined by
Cs(τb, τe;hb, he) = max
q
{I(X ;Yb)− I(X ;Ye)}. (4)
III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will derive the average secrecy capacity
and its lower bound based on bit error probabilities.
A. Bit error probability
In binary-level OOK, each bit symbol is transmitted by
pulsing the light source either on (for input symbol ‘1’)
or off (for ‘0’) during each bit time. In the corresponding
threshold detection, we say a ‘1’ is received when the output
of the detector exceeds a threshold value, or else a ‘0’ is
received during each bit time [11]. Because of noise, errors
may be made at Bob or Eve in determining the actual symbols
transmitted. For instance, a ‘0’ might be mistaken for a ‘1’,
which is denoted by P(1|0). Also a ‘1’ might be mistaken
for a ‘0’, which is denoted by P(0|1). In the case a ‘0’ is
transmitted, the received signal is observed to be independent
of irradiance fading state, which is given by Yu ∼ N (0, σ2u)
with u ∈ {b, e}. On the other hand, when a ‘1’ is transmitted,
the received signal under a given realization hu of fading state
Hu is given by Yu ∼ N (yu, σ2u), where yu = Suhu denotes
the mean value of output signal current under the state hu.
1In the context of fading channel, the capacity for a particular fading state
is called instantaneous capacity and the expected value over the domain of
fading state is called average capacity.
For a given detection threshold τu at user u, the bit error
probabilities of u’s channel can be derived by
Pu(1|0) = 1√
2piσu
∫ +∞
τu
e
− y2
2σ2u dy
=
1
2
erfc
(
τu√
2σu
)
(5)
and
Pu(0|1) = 1√
2piσu
∫ τu
−∞
e
− (y−yu)
2
2σ2u dy
=
1
2
erfc
(
yu − τu√
2σu
)
(6)
under the state hu. Here, erfc(x) = 2√pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2
dt is the
complementary error function.
A special scenario of the detection thresholds that has been
widely used in the literature, see [11], [16], are
τb =
E(Yb|X = 0, hb) + E(Yb|X = 1, hb)
2
, (7)
τe =
E(Ye|X = 0, he) + E(Ye|X = 1, he)
2
(8)
where E(Yb|X = 1, hb) refers to the Bob’s expected signal
amplitude for bit ‘1’ conditioned on a particular fading state
hb, and the other similar notations can be explained likewise.
In our channel model, we have E(Yu|X = 1, hu) = Suhu and
E(Yu|X = 0, hu) = 0 with u ∈ {b, e}. Then, the bit error
probabilities under this special scenario are
Pb(1|0) = Pb(0|1) = 1
2
erfc
(
Sbhb
2
√
2σb
)
(9)
and
Pe(1|0) = Pe(0|1) = 1
2
erfc
(
Sehe
2
√
2σe
)
. (10)
For simplicity, let Pb(1|0) = Pb(0|1) = εb and Pe(1|0) =
Pe(0|1) = εe. This shows that the “halfway” settings of
the threshold value in (7) and (8) lead to binary symmetric
channels with crossover probabilities εb for Bob’s channel and
εe for Eve’s channel.
B. Lower bound of instantaneous secrecy capacity
Finding a closed-form result of Cs is often a tedious if not
impossible task as the maximization operation relies on several
parameters like the channel fading states Hb and He, noises
Zb and Ze, and detection thresholds τb and τe. We now derive
a lower bound of the instantaneous secrecy capacity under a
given pair of states hb and he.
Cs(hb, he)
≥
[
max
q= 12 ,τb
{I(X ;Yb)−max
τe
I(X ;Ye)}
]+
=
[
max
τb
I
(
X ;Yb|q = 1
2
)
−max
τe
I
(
X ;Ye|q = 1
2
)]+
= Cs(hb, he)
where [x]+ = max{0, x}, I (X ;Y |q) is the mutual informa-
tion between X and Y conditioned on q. We use Cs(hb, he)
to denote this lower bound. In order to calculate Cs(hb, he),
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When q = 1/2, the eavesdropper chan-
nel’s maximum information rate under the fading state he,
maxτe I
(
X ;Ye|q = 12
)
, is achieved by the “halfway” setting
of the threshold value in (8).
Proof: See Appendix A.
From Lemma 1, we have
max
τe
I
(
X ;Ye|q = 1
2
)
= 1−H(εe). (11)
Although Lemma 1 is built for Eve’s channel, it also applies
to Bob’s channel. Therefore, we can derive the lower bound
of secrecy capacity for any hb and he as
Cs(hb, he) =
[H(εe)−H(εb)]+ , (12)
where H(·) is the binary entropy function given by
H(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p). (13)
Lemma 2: When τb and τe adopt the “halfway” settings
given in (7) and (8), the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate
is given by
Cs
(
τb =
yb
2
, τe =
ye
2
;hb, he
)
=
[H(εe)−H(εb)]+ . (14)
and it is achieved when the input probability q = 1/2.
Proof: When τb = yb/2 and τe = ye/2, the channel can
be viewed as a binary symmetric broadcast channel (BSBC).
The secrecy capacity of BSBC is given by [17, Lemma 1]
Cs
(
τb =
yb
2
, τe =
ye
2
;hb, he
)
=
[H(εe)−H(εb)]+ .
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we observe that the maxi-
mum instantaneous secrecy rate under the “halfway” settings
of the threshold value in (7) and (8) equals to the lower bound
of instantaneous secrecy capacity, that is
Cs
(
τb =
yb
2
, τe =
ye
2
;hb, he
)
= Cs(hb, he). (15)
C. Average secrecy capacity
Like the calculation of average secrecy capacity of fading
wiretap channel in wireless radio-frequency (RF) communica-
tion [18], the average secrecy capacity for the concerned FSO
model is similarly calculated by first deriving the instantaneous
secrecy capacity for a given pair of states hb and he and
then integrating them over the domain of (Hb, He). Thus,
we establish the following theorem on the average secrecy
capacity of the concerned FSO system and a lower bound to
simplify its calculation.
Theorem 1: For the concerned binary-level OOK modula-
tion and threshold detection, the average secrecy capacity of
the FSO channel is given by
Cs =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Cs(hb, he)fHb,He(hb, he)dhbdhe, (16)
where Cs(hb, he) is given in (3) and fHb,He(hb, he) is the joint
probability density function (PDF) of the RVs Hb and He.
Furthermore, the average secrecy capacity is lower bounded
by
Cs =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[H (εe)−H (εb)]+ fHb,He(hb, he)dhbdhe, (17)
where H(·) is given in (13), and εb and εe are given in (9)
and (10), respectively.
Proof: The proof for the average secrecy capacity is
quite simple. For a given pair hb and he, the instantaneous
secrecy capacity is given by the definition (3). Since Hb
and He vary independently from codeword to codeword, the
average secrecy capacity can be derived by integrating the
instantaneous secrecy capacity over the regions of Hb and He.
We now prove the lower bound. The lower bound of the
instantaneous secrecy capacity under a given pair of states hb
and he has been derived in (12). Hence, the lower bound of the
fading FSO channel can be derived by integrating this bound
over the regions of Hb and He
Cs =
∫ ∫
Cs(hb, he)fHb,He(hb, he)dhbdhe. (18)
Thus, the result in (17) is proved.
It is worth noting that Cs is estimated to be tight since the
“halfway” setting of the detection threshold yields a minimum
error probability2. Moreover, it is notable that the lower bound,
which greatly simplified our secrecy capacity formula, can
be achieved based on a simple design principle in practical
applications.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Several statistical channel models have been proposed in the
literature for the distribution of turbulence-induced fading in
FSO systems. It is well accepted that for weak to moderate
turbulence strength the log-normal model is valid, for moder-
ate to strong turbulence the gamma-gamma model is effective,
and in the limit of strong turbulence (i.e., in saturation regime
and beyond) the negative exponential model is suitable [12].
A. Log-normally distributed irradiance model
We now specializes the secrecy capacity result to the log-
normally distributed irradiance model, which applies to the
FSO systems deployed over relatively short ranges in urban
areas [1]. Recall that Hu is a mean-normalized irradiance
fading RV. In the log-normal fading model, the PDF of Hu is
expressed as
fHu(h) =
1√
2piσ2Tuh
exp
(
− (ln(h)− µTu)
2
2σ2Tu
)
, h > 0 (19)
where Hu = eTu with Tu ∼ N (µTu , σ2Tu), and σ2Tu is
the Rytov variance, a parameter characterizing the strength
of atmospheric turbulence. Note that the mean-normalized
2It is observed that the overall error probability P(1|0) + P(0|1) is
minimized at the detection threshold under the “halfway” setting.
condition E[Hu] = 1 requires the choice of µTu = −σ2Tu/2.
In general, σ2Tu is a function of the refractive structure index
C2n(·) and the horizontal distance L traveled by the optical
radiation. C2n(·) typically ranges from 10−12 m−2/3 for the
strong turbulence to 10−17 m−2/3 for the weak turbulence
with a typical average value being 10−15 m−2/3. However, for
horizontal optical propagation, as is the case in most terrestrial
applications, the refractive structure index C2n is constant and
the Rytov variance is thus given by [12]
σ2Tu = 1.23C
2
nk
7/6L11/6, (20)
where k is the wave number (i.e., k = 2pi/λ with λ the optical
wavelength). Note that for horizontal communication, L equals
du in Section II-A. The weak, moderate, and strong intensity
fluctuations are associated with σ2Tu < 1, σ
2
Tu
≈ 1 and σ2Tu >
1, respectively [5]. In table II, we list pairs of σ2Tu and L for a
typical wavelength λ = 1.5µm and C2n = 10−15m−2/3 based
on (20).
When Eve’s location is close to Bob, Hb and He are
assumed to be correlated as the signals received by them
go through a similar atmospheric environment [7], [16], [19].
Hence, their joint PDF [16] is given in (21) at the bottom of
this page. In (21), ρ denotes the correlation coefficient between
Tb and Te. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between Hb
and He is denoted by ρH , and it is related to ρ as follows [16]
ρ =
ln
(
ρH
√(
exp(σ2Tb)− 1
) (
exp(σ2Te )− 1
)
+ 1
)
σTbσTe
. (22)
Here, ρH can be calculated based on the experimental data
and its mathematical definition
ρH =
Cov(Hb, He)√
Var(Hb)Var(He)
. (23)
By substituting (21) into (17), we can derive the lower
bound of secrecy capacity under the log-normally distributed
irradiance model.
B. Numerical analysis
Since even the numerical simulation of the exact average
secrecy capacity is very difficult, we will focus on analyzing
the numerical results of the lower bound of average secrecy
capacity. To illustrate the impact of correlation between Bob’s
and Eve’s channels on the average secrecy capacity, we show
in Fig. 1 how Cs varies with the average electrical signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) at Bob, i.e., γb = Sbσb , for a given average
electrical SNR at Eve, i.e., γe = Seσe , under several channel
correlation levels. The parameters in Fig. 1 are set to γe =
0 dB and σ2Tb = σ
2
Te
= 1. Figure 1 shows that for given γb and
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR λ = 1.5µm AND C2n = 10−15 m−2/3 IN WEAK
ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE
σ2Tu
0.1 0.5 1
L 2.4 km 5.7 km 8.3 km
γe, Cs is smaller when Hb and He are more correlated, which
indicates that the channel correlation has a negative impact on
the average secrecy capacity. However, such impact becomes
very weak (almost disappeared) when γb ≫ γe. Figure 1 also
shows that a moderate channel correlation (e.g., ρ = 0.1) does
not have significant effect on the secrecy capacity.
To illustrate the impact of fading on the average secrecy
capacity, we add in Fig. 1 the similarly defined lower bound of
secrecy capacity in additive white Gaussian (AWGN) channels
with the same γb and γe as in fading channels. One can easily
observe that, in AWGN channels, positive secrecy capacity
cannot be achieved when γb ≤ γe, i.e., γb ≤ 0 dB in
Fig. 1. On the contrary, in the presence of fading, positive
secrecy capacity can still be achieved even when γb ≤ γe.
Note that a similar conclusion has been made in wireless RF
communication [4]. However, in the case γb is much larger
than γe, one can observe that Cs of the fading channels is
smaller than that of the AWGN channels, which indicates
fading has a negative impact on the secrecy capacity when
γb ≫ γe.
Figure 2 depicts how the turbulence (fading) strength actu-
ally affects the secrecy capacity in weak atmospheric turbu-
lence for which the log-normal fading is valid. We use three
values of σ2Tb as given in Table II while keeping σ
2
Te
fixed
to show three different cases: σ2Tb > σ
2
Te
, σ2Tb = σ
2
Te
and
σ2Tb < σ
2
Te
. One can observe that in typical laser communica-
tion scenario with γb ≫ γe (e.g., γb = 10 dB in Fig. 2), Cs is
larger for a weaker turbulence like σ2Tb < σ
2
Te
, which indicates
that the atmospheric turbulence has a negative impact on the
secrecy capacity. However, in other scenarios when γb is not
that large (or maybe smaller) compared to γe, the atmospheric
turbulence actually is helpful to the secrecy capacity.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of transmitting con-
fidential information between two legitimate users over the
FSO link in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. We
have established a general formula for the average secrecy
capacity of the laser-based FSO system with OOK modulation
and threshold detection. We then specialized the formula to the
particular correlated log-normal fading model and conducted
numerical analysis. Our results reveal that turbulence-induced
fHb,He(hb, he) =
1
2piσTbσTe
√
1− ρ2hbhe
× exp
[
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
(
(ln(hb)− µTb)2
σ2Tb
− 2ρ (ln(hb)− µTb) (ln(he)− µTe)
σTbσTe
+
(ln(he)− µTe)2
σ2Te
)]
(21)
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Fig. 1. Cs vs. γb under the correlated log-normal fading model with
correlation coefficient ρ = {0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and under the AWGN model.
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Fig. 2. Cs vs. γb for three cases of turbulence strength.
fading Hu as well as the turbulence strength σ2Tu has a negative
impact on the secrecy capacity when Bob’s channel condition
is much better than Eve’s (i.e., γb ≫ γe), but is possible to
provide positive impact otherwise. On the other hand, channel
correlation is harmful to the secrecy capacity in all conditions,
which agrees with the previous result regarding the impact
of channel correlation on secrecy capacity in wireless RF
communication [20].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
When q = 1/2 (i.e., PX(1) = PX(0) = 1/2), we have
I(X ;Ye|q = 1
2
)
= H
(
1
2
+
1
2
(εe0 − εe1)
)
− 1
2
[H (εe0) +H (εe1)] , (24)
where εe0 = Pe(1|0) and εe1 = Pe(0|1) are given in (5) and
(6), respectively. Replacing εe0 = 12erfc
(
τe√
2σe
)
and εe1 =
1
2erfc
(
Sehe−τe√
2σe
)
into (24), we then calculate the following
maximum value
max
τe∈[0,∞)
{
H
(
1
2
+
1
2
(εe0 − εe1)
)
− 1
2
[H (εe0) +H (εe1)]
}
.
(25)
Let f(τe) = I(X ;Ye|q = 12 ), and we expect that f(τe)
is a concave function of τe. Denoting τe∗ as the parameter
achieving the maximum value of maxτe∈[0,∞) f(τe), we can
derive τe∗ by letting the first derivative of f(τe) with respect
to τe equal to 0. And we have
∂f(τe)
∂τe
=
1
2 log 2
log
(
1− (εe0 − εe1)
1 + (εe0 − εe1)
· ε
e
0
1− εe0
)
∂εe0
∂τe
− 1
2 log 2
log
(
1− (εe0 − εe1)
1 + (εe0 − εe1)
· 1− ε
e
1
εe1
)
∂εe1
∂τe
. (26)
It can be easily validated that τe∗ = Sehe/2 makes ∂f(τe)∂τe = 0,
which indicates the maximum value is achieved at τe∗ =
Sehe/2. Furthermore, numerical check has also been con-
ducted to validate that τe∗ = Sehe/2 maximizes f(τe).
Therefore, Lemma 1 is proved.
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